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Articles
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION AS CHILD
TRAFFICKING
David M. Smolin*
When is intercountry adoption a form of child trafficking? The
purpose of this Article is to attempt to answer this question, particularly
from the perspective of international law. As it turns out, the answer is
surprisingly obscure. Thus, a second purpose of this Article is to explain
why a question so central to the ethical and legal legitimacy of
intercountry adoption is so difficult to answer.
Part I of this Article explores some of the ideological and ethical
dilemmas that initially make it difficult to distinguish intercountry
adoption from child trafficking, and argues that an exploration of legal
standards may represent a way out of the ideological impasse. Part II
explores in some detail the question of when abusive adoption practices
constitute illicit child trafficking under international law. Part II.A
discusses the development of the international law of trafficking from its
roots in anti-slavery conventions. It is particularly significant that the
law has often refused to define the mere sale of a person as a form of
trafficking; instead, the law has defined illicit trafficking to require some
form of exploitation beyond sale, such as enslavement, sexual
exploitation, or exploitative labor. Part II.B discusses contemporary
international law documents which specifically address abusive
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on, earlier versions of this Article. I also benefited from the comments of a number of
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addition, I wish to thank three Cumberland students, Vickie Willard, Ashley Mims, and
Ken Scheinert, for their research assistance. Finally, it has become traditional for members
of the adoption triad writing about adoption to note their personal experience with
adoption; in this regard, it may be relevant that my wife and I are parents of older,
internationally adopted children. Under these circumstances, I particularly wish to thank
my wife, and adoptive and birth children, who have contributed so much to my
developing understanding of these issues.
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adoption practices as a form of trafficking. The recent movement of
international law to address abusive adoption practices as a form of illicit
traffic or child selling is cautious and incomplete. Initially, it appeared
that at least some abusive adoption practices involving the transfer of
children for financial consideration had been clearly condemned as a
form of illicit child selling or child trafficking. However, a closer
analysis of these provisions, in the context of both domestic and
intercountry adoption, reveals that their prohibitions of abusive
adoption practices as trafficking are largely illusory and ineffective. The
law and practice regarding money and adoption turn out to be so mired
in legal fictions and regulatory gaps as to make it extraordinarily
difficult to distinguish between licit and illicit payments. The law of
both domestic and intercountry adoption systems are compromised in
their capacity to prohibit abusive adoption practices, because they have
habitually permitted market behavior to predominate, while excusing
such behavior through legal fictions.
The Conclusion compares Judge Richard Posner’s use of verbal
formulas in defending his famous market approach to adoption, with the
use of similar verbal formulas in the law. These verbal formulas repeat
the law’s earlier reluctance to define the sale of a person as a form of
illicit trafficking, absent some further enslavement or exploitation of the
person. The Conclusion suggests that the law uses verbal formulas and
legal fictions to implicitly permit what Judge Posner so controversially
advocated, the creation of an adoption market in children. Under these
circumstances, it turns out that the actual practices of intercountry
adoption are, in systemic forms, a form of child selling or child
trafficking. This is not to say that every individual adoption is illicit or
unethical, but rather that the adoption system has become so intertwined
with market behavior as to, in theory and practice, frequently permit
child selling as a form of adoption. While some of the most important
sending nations are generally free of child trafficking within their
adoption systems, the adoption systems of a significant number of
sending nations have been seriously impacted by abusive practices
related to money and the transfer of children. This Article concludes that
unless significant reforms are adopted, intercountry adoption will
eventually be abolished with history judging it as another form of
exploitation. Therefore, even assuming that intercountry adoption is not
inherently exploitative or a form of child trafficking, it will be judged
such, because the legal system and adoption practice have permitted
intercountry adoption to operate as a market in human beings.
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I. WHY IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH CHILD TRAFFICKING FROM
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: PROBLEMS OF IDEOLOGY AND ETHICS
The association of child trafficking with intercountry adoption will
likely strike some readers as obvious, others as offensive. To some,
intercountry adoption in itself is more or less a form of child trafficking,
as it involves the transfer of children from poor nations to rich nations in
order to meet the demand of those in rich nations for children. The fact
that those seeking to adopt want daughters and sons, not sex or labor,
seems to make little difference for those most ideologically opposed to
intercountry adoption. In broad terms, it is still a matter of the citizens
of rich countries using their wealth and power to “buy” the vulnerable
children of the poor. From this perspective, those who really care about
the suffering of children in developing nations should provide assistance
and help to children within their own societies, rather than spending
inordinate sums to strip children of their national identity, native
culture, and language.
By contrast, those most supportive of intercountry adoption perceive
literally millions of children in need of intercountry adoption in
developing and transition economy nations. Children abandoned,
killed, left in dismal orphanages, or living on the streets bear horrific
testimony to the pressing need for adoption. From this perspective,
ethical or political objections to intercountry adoption lack legitimacy,
since they sacrifice the concrete good of children to ideological idols.1
These sharply conflicting views of intercountry adoption engender
confusion. When one group views intercountry adoption as a form of
child trafficking, while another views intercountry adoption as a
beautiful act of compassion, the actual operation of our system of
intercountry adoption becomes obscured. Continuing the ideological
debate over whether intercountry adoption is inherently good or evil is a
fool’s errand, like so many other ideological debates leading further and
further afield into conflicting worldviews. The resolution of such
worldview conflicts cannot be found in the realm of brute facts—if there
even is such a realm—because facts are viewed through the lens of

1
For useful summaries and citations regarding the ideological conflicts over
intercountry adoption, see ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY,
AND THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION xxi-xxii, 141-63 (Beacon Press 1999) (1993);
Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human Rights Principles:
Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child with the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT’L L. J. 179 (2003).
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worldviews, and often seem powerless to conquer strong ideological
commitment.
Fortunately, it is possible to bring some clarity to the debates
concerning intercountry adoption, despite the inability to resolve the
core ideological conflicts. We can seek broadly acceptable definitions for
when adoption has clearly denigrated into child trafficking, even if we
cannot agree on whether intercountry adoption is per se a form of
trafficking. We can seek reform of intercountry adoption, even as some
argue that intercountry adoption is an evil that should be abolished.
Initially, it is helpful to guide the ethical inquiry over intercountry
adoption by reference to two adoption “triads.”2 The first triad, intrinsic
to adoption itself, is the set of complex relationships between birth
family, adoptive family, and child. The second triad, specific to
intercountry adoption, is the complex set of relationships between the
child and sending and receiving nations.
CHILD

BIRTH
FAMILY

CHILD

ADOPTIVE
FAMILY

BIRTH
NATION

ADOPTIVE
NATION

The ethical touchstone of intercountry adoption should be the
imperative to respect the dignity and rights of all members of both
triads. This imperative comes not merely from the broad ethical
mandate to respect all human persons, and all nation-states, but it also
follows from the unique nature of the adoption triads. In each adoption
triad, the child is the central figure because the child is inherently and
permanently connected in profound ways to all of the other triad
members and links the triad members to one another. The child’s
inherent and permanent relationship to all triad members means that the
2
The language of an adoption “triad” or “triangle” is common in adoption literature.
See, e.g., E. WAYNE CARP, ADOPTION IN AMERICA, at 1, 19 (2002) [hereinafter CARP,
ADOPTION]; ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET. AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: SEALED OR OPEN
RECORDS: HOW THEY AFFECTED ADOPTEES, BIRTHPARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS (1978).
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child’s best interests cannot be considered in isolation from the rights of
the other triad members. An adoption built upon a severe deprivation of
the rights of the birth family, for example, intrinsically harms the child as
well, because of the child’s profound and permanent connection to her
birth family. The same can be said about all of the other members of
each triad. Thus, to the degree that adoption seriously harms a triad
member, the child also is harmed. From this perspective, the only kind
of adoption that can serve the “best interests of children” is adoption that
honors all triad members. Of course this does not mean that all triad
members receive everything they demand, but it does mean that
attempts to save children at the expense of the dignity and well-being of
birth or adoption families or nations are inherently flawed. Ethical
adoption, therefore, is adoption that respects the dignity and rights of all
triad members.
The adoption triad reminds us that the legal fiction of no continuing
relationship between adopted child and birth family is just that—a
fiction. Indeed, the contemporary experience of adoption indicates that
even adopted individuals with excellent relationships with their
adoptive families yearn to know, or at least know about, their birth
families.3 Reunions are attempted and arranged across the barriers of
oceans, cultures, and language.4 In intercountry adoption, moreover, the
continuing psychological link to the birth family is closely related to the
continuing link to the birth nation. Consider, for example, the common
instance of a Korean girl adopted by a white American family. It would
take a willful blindness to deny the Korean adoptee’s family ties to
Korean parents and the nation of Korea. Indeed, the Korean adoptee
cannot escape the obvious—that her physical body did not descend in
any way from her adoptive parents. Every part of her physical
appearance points back to Korea. No matter how American she is, she is
also inevitably, permanently, and inescapably Korean.5 Thus, any
system of adoption built upon denying her Korean identity—or
demeaning, dishonoring, or victimizing the family and nation from
which she came—in principle harms the adoptee herself.

3
See Barbara Melosh, Adoption Stories, in ADOPTION IN AMERICA 218-45 (E. Wayne Carp
ed., 2002) (reviewing literature of adoption narratives).
4
See, e.g., JANE JEONG TRENKA, THE LANGUAGE OF BLOOD: A MEMOIR (2003); FIRST
PERSON PLURAL (Dean Bortshay Liem 2000) (documentary film).
5
See ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION: HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING AMERICA 52-53 (2000).
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From this perspective, intercountry adoption is neither an inherent
good nor an inherent evil but rather it is a potential or conditional good.
To the degree that an adoption, or system of adoption, meets the criteria
of treating all triad members fairly—giving them their “due”—then the
system has positive merit. To the degree that an adoption, or system of
adoption, victimizes or demeans one or more triad members, adoption is
no longer a good, but becomes—at least in significant part—an evil, and
one that is generally harmful to the child.
As a matter of abstract philosophy, it might be possible to become
lost in interminable debates over what it means to respect members of
the triad.6 Fortunately, however, it is possible to rely on legal documents
and principles defining proper treatment toward the various triad
members. These legal documents provide, at a minimum, plausible
starting points for defining the proper treatment of each triad member,
and hence, the minimum requisites of a legitimate intercountry
adoption. These legal documents also stand for the proposition that
certain legal harms, such as trafficking or selling children, generally
cannot be justified by claims of other “goods.” Although it is certainly
possible to argue that these legal standards are ethically flawed, this
Article will presume that these legal standards, many of which are
drawn from international legal materials, are plausible from a broad
range of worldviews. After all, an attempt to “save a child” by reducing
the child to an article of commerce, or by inducing her birth parents to
sell her, would seek to validate victimization of the child and her loved
ones in the name of the best interests of the child.
A purpose of this Article, therefore, will be to look beyond the fog of
the ideological conflict, to the legal standards for a legitimate
intercountry adoption. Put another way, this Article will seek the legal
standard for discovering when intercountry adoption is really a form of
child trafficking, and hence is legally and ethically illegitimate.

6
As Professor Carp has noted, the position that adoption, or at least traditional closed
adoption, is inherently harmful to the child, leads to the argument that such adoption
should be abolished. E.g., E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURES IN
THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION 222 (1998) [hereinafter CARP, FAMILY MATTERS] (noting the
parallel argument in regard to intercountry adoption is that intercountry adoption is
inherently exploitative and harms children by stripping them of their culture and
language). I am seeking to avoid these ideological arguments, however valid or invalid,
and instead attempt to apply broadly acceptable legal and ethical standards against selling
and trafficking children.
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II. DEFINING ADOPTION AS CHILD TRAFFICKING: THE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Development of International Definitions on Trafficking
Despite the broad international condemnation of trafficking in
children, it is not easy to find a complete and authoritative legal
definition. Under these circumstances, it is helpful to begin with the
dictionary definitions of the terms “traffick” or “trafficking.” The most
relevant meanings of these terms include the import and export trade,
and the business of buying and selling.7 The concept of trafficking in
children generally refers, therefore, to the buying and selling of children.
The term would be most applicable where a child was sold and then
moved a significant distance, particularly across borders, but any sale of
a child should suffice as a form of “trafficking.” Thus, a sale of a child
would be a form of “child trafficking.”
It should also be helpful to trace the lineage of the legal
condemnation of child trafficking. The legal conception of trafficking
appears to be a derivative of long-standing legal condemnations of
slavery and “slavery-like” practices. Logically, the link is obvious:
normally the buying and selling of human beings implies a kind of
ownership of a human being equivalent to, or at least analogous to,
slavery. Both buying and selling human beings, and enslaving them,
reduces human beings to articles of commerce. Moreover, slavery has
generally been associated with the “slave trade,” and hence efforts to
abolish slavery have also focused on abolishing the “slave trade.” Since
the term “trade” and “trafficking” can be used as synonyms, the term
“trafficking” in this context connotes a kind of slave trade.
It is therefore possible to follow the international concern with
trafficking in children as a development of international documents
intended to abolish slavery. In the 1926 Slavery Convention (“1926
Convention”), slavery is defined as “the status or condition of a person
over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership
are exercised.”8 The “slave trade”:
[I]ncludes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or
disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery;
all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view
WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 938 (7th ed. 1967).
Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, art. 1(1), T.S. No. 778 [hereinafter 1926 Slavery
Convention].
7
8
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to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale
or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being
sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade or
transport in slaves.9
The ambiguity of this definition is made evident by its application to
the kinds of abusive adoption practices at concern in this Article. For
example, in the Andhra Pradesh, India adoption scandals it was revealed
that scouts had been sent to purchase infants from impoverished birth
parents; the scout in turn would be paid by the orphanage for the child,
receiving a substantially higher sum than had been paid to the birth
parents. In this instance, the child would have been sold twice: once by
the birth parent to the scout, and then a second time, at a profit, by the
scout to the orphanage. The orphanage would then place the child for
adoption to a family in the United States, receiving adoption “fees” more
than ten times higher than what it had paid for the child.10 Similarly,
some U.S. agents apparently hire “spotters” as their agents in Latin
America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, paying these intermediaries
“bounties” as high as ten-thousand dollars for each child they find, and
apparently not looking too closely at how the children were obtained.11
Do such practices constitute either the “slave trade” or “slavery” under
the 1926 Convention?
A close examination of the definition of the “slave trade” reveals that
the mere sale of a human being is not necessarily sufficient to meet the
definition; instead, the sale must involve either the sale of a “slave” or
the intent to reduce the individual to slavery. The question therefore
becomes: Are children slaves or under slavery, merely because they
have been sold? The legal definition of “slavery” is ambiguous on this
point, for the definition of slavery leaves its key terms—“powers
attaching to the right of ownership”—undefined. A slave is someone
over whom any power “attaching to the right of ownership” is
“exercised,” but what are those powers? It could be argued that the
power to sell or alienate is a traditional “right of ownership,” and
therefore that selling a human being makes her a slave, regardless of
what is done with the person. According to this interpretation, a child
purchased from her birth parents and resold to an orphanage would be a

Id. at art. 1(2).
See David M. Smolin, The Two Faces of Intercountry Adoption: The Significance of the
Indian Adoption Scandals, SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2005).
11
See PERTMAN, supra note 5, at 195-96.
9

10
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slave, even though the ultimate intent and result of this process was to
place her into an adoptive family.
Such an interpretation has both legal and intuitive flaws. Legally
speaking, it renders certain terms in the definition of “slave trade”
superfluous. The definition of “slave trade” has several definitions all
involving two elements: One element pertains to sale or exchange. A
second element requires the person exchanged to be a “slave” or the
persons exchanging to possess the intent to “reduce . . . to slavery.” If
the element of sale or exchange of a person by definition meets the
definition of slavery, then the second element is superfluous, for by
definition every sale or exchange of a person would constitute the sale or
exchange of a slave. A legal interpretation that renders a key element of
a definition superfluous would generally be disfavored.
Second, it is counter-intuitive to view every “sale” of a person as
rendering that person a slave. While the children purchased from birth
parents and scouts were bought and sold like chattel, the ultimate intent
was to place the children into families as sons or daughters, which seems
contrary to the definition of a slave. Of course it is possible to take an
ideological position that the custodial status of being a child is a kind of
slavery, but that position certainly does not reflect the perspective of the
law. The purpose of anti-slavery and anti-trafficking provisions, after
all, is not to abolish childhood or the family. It is counter-intuitive to call
an infant sold for purposes of adoption a “slave,” despite the repugnant
nature of the act.
The ambiguities and limitations in the definitions of slavery and the
slave trade in the 1926 Convention are addressed in the 1956
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (“Supplementary
Slavery Convention”).12
Interestingly, the Supplementary Slavery
Convention retains the definition of “slavery” of the 1926 Convention13
and almost the entire definition of “slave trade” from the 1926
Convention. Although easy to miss, however, the slight change in the
“slave trade” definition may be significant. The 1926 Convention stated
that the slave trade “includes . . . all acts of disposal by sale or exchange
12
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Supplementary Slavery Convention].
13
Compare 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 8, at art. 1(1), with Supplementary
Slavery Convention, supra note 12, at art. 7(a).
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of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged.” 14 However,
the Supplementary Slavery Convention defined slave trade to
“include . . . all acts of disposal of a person acquired with a view to being
sold or exchanged.15
This slight change of wording from “slave” to “person” would seem
to mean that the mere “disposal”—including sale—of a human being
who was “acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged” now would
constitute the slave trade. Thus, when individuals in India bought
infants from birth parents, with a plan to re-sell the children to an
orphanage, this would apparently constitute the slave trade, even
though the children were to be placed into adoption. A sale of a human
being could constitute the “slave trade,” even if the person sold was
never made into a “slave.”
This interpretation, however, founders on an examination of the rest
of the Supplementary Slavery Convention, which in every other
context—and every operative context pertaining to slavery—refers to the
transfer, conveyance, branding, and marking, of slaves, rather than of
persons.16 Indeed, even if this new definition of the slave trade in the
Supplementary Slavery Convention is taken literally, there is no
generalized provision within the Supplementary Slavery Convention
condemning the slave trade as such.17
The assumption of the
Supplementary Slavery Convention is that it is “supplementary” to the
1926 Convention, and therefore the Supplementary Slavery Convention
does not repeat the core undertaking of the 1926 Convention to prohibit
slavery or the slave trade.
The issues posed by the Supplementary Slavery Convention go
beyond the significance of this re-worded definition of the slave trade, to
encompass the Supplementary Slavery Convention’s broadening concern
with “Practices Similar to Slavery.”18 Thus, the Convention requires
state parties to take necessary measures to abolish certain practices,
“whether or not they are covered by the definition of slavery contained

1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 8, at art. 1(2) (emphasis added).
Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 12, at art. 7(c) (emphasis added).
16
See id. at art. 3-7.
17
Article 3 creates undertakings to prohibit various aspects of the slave trade, but the
first three subsections refer to slaves; article 3(4) does refer to international cooperation in
combating the “slave trade.” See id. at art. 3.
18
The term “Practices Similar to Slavery” comes from the title of the Convention. See id.
at art. 1.
14
15
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in Article 1 of the Slavery Convention.”19 These practices include debt
bondage, serfdom, various practices transferring women involuntarily,
and certain matters involving children.20 The provisions involving
women and children are most relevant to the issue of adoption.
In regard to women, the Convention requires state parties to bring
about the abolition of “any institution or practice” whereby “[a] woman,
without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment
of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or
any other person or group.”21
Thus, transferring a woman for financial consideration into a marital
relationship, without her consent, is condemned as a practice similar to
slavery. This provision is not based on the viewpoint that the status of a
wife is a kind of slavery, either generally or within particular cultural
contexts, however much some might argue for such a perspective. Thus,
this practice is condemned even though the individual sold is not
reduced to the status of a slave.
From one perspective, this provision on women is directly analogous
to the sale of a child for adoption: In both instances an individual is
involuntarily sold for financial consideration into a family relationship.
The difficulty with the analogy, however, is the key difference between a
woman and a child. It is permissible for an infant to be transferred into a
family relationship without the infant’s consent, particularly since
infants lack the capacity to consent. The question of women, whether
minors or adults, marrying without consent is, however, an entirely
different matter. Even if women—or men—have in some cultures in the
past married by the will of their parents or family, without their consent,
this practice is condemned in modern international law. Thus, the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1976 International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights both declare that
“[m]arriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of
the intending spouses.”22

Id.
Id. at art. 1(a), (b), (c), (d).
21
Id. at art. 1(c).
22
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). There are some
insignificant differences in wording between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
19
20
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This difference between “transfers” of women and transfers of
children may be highlighted by analyzing another of the subsections of
the Supplementary Slavery Convention, which condemns the practice
whereby a “woman, on the death of her husband, is liable to be inherited
by another person.”23 Within the context of the Supplementary Slavery
Convention, it appears that this section primarily refers to practices
whereby a widow is involuntarily assigned a new husband—often a
relative of her husband—upon her husband’s death. In order to
compare the situation of women to children, we should ask whether a
similar practice concerning children would be so clearly condemned.
What if a parent provided that upon her death, her child would become
the child of a certain individual—perhaps an uncle or aunt of the child?
Such a practice is in fact not substantially different from the
contemporary U.S. practice of including a guardianship provision in a
will, providing who shall be the guardian of the child upon the death of
a parent. Such a provision is generally viewed positively, rather than
negatively, even though one could rhetorically refer to it as “inheriting”
a child.
The forbidden practice in which a widow is passed as a kind of
inheritance does not involve any financial consideration. Similarly,
another subsection of the Supplementary Slavery Convention condemns
practices whereby “[t]he husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has
the right to transfer her to another person for value received or
otherwise.”24
This provision can involve transfers for financial
consideration, but does not require such financial consideration: It is the
“transfer” of the woman which is the essence of the wrong. The
Convention’s prohibition of a bride price, discussed above, does involve
financial consideration, but only forbids the giving of such financial
consideration when the woman has no right to refuse. Thus, a bride
price is apparently permissible under the Supplementary Slavery
Convention so long as the woman has the right to refuse the marriage.25
Therefore, the essence of the forbidden slavery-like practices affecting
women is not the financial consideration or sale, but rather the
involuntary marriage of the woman. Thus, the provisions of the
Supplementary Slavery Convention are treating as a “slavery-like”
practice the involuntary transfer of women into the family relationship
of marriage. Given the Convention’s focus on lack of consent, the
Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 12, at art. 1(c)(iii).
Id. at art. 1(c)(ii).
25
Id. at art. 1(c)(i) (“A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage
on payment of a consideration.”) (emphasis added).
23
24
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provisions on transfer of women for marriage cannot be analogized to
the transfer of children for purposes of adoption, as infants necessarily
are transferred for adoption without their consent. Indeed, the failure of
the Supplementary Slavery Convention to include parallel provisions
concerning children could be viewed as a deliberate decision not to
condemn the sale of children for adoption as a practice “similar to
slavery.”
The Supplementary Slavery Convention does contain a specific
provision on children, which condemns any “institution or practice
whereby a child . . . is delivered by either or both of his natural parents
or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a
view to the exploitation of the child . . . or of his labour.”26
In this provision, the question of financial consideration received for
the transfer is secondary, as the wrong can occur without receipt of such
consideration. The essence of the wrong is the transfer by the parent to
another person with a “view” toward the “exploitation of the child.”27
There are two key ambiguities here. The first is the question of who
must possess the evil intent, or “view,” to exploit the child. Must the
parent who delivers the child possess the culpable intent, or is it
sufficient if the person receiving the child possesses this intent to exploit?
This question is not an academic question, as contemporary child
trafficking often involves individuals obtaining the child through
misleading the parents. Parents may be told that their children will
receive benefits, like education, apprenticeships, or good jobs, when the
real intent is to exploit the children through prostitution or illicit and
hazardous child labor.28 Similarly, in intercountry adoption it sometimes
happens that parents believe their children are only being taken away on
a temporary basis, to receive benefits like housing, food, and an
education, while the persons receiving the children actually intend the
children to be adopted.29 It is unfortunate that this provision is not
Id. art. (1)(d).
Id.
28
See, e.g., Anti-Slavery Society, Child Slaves of South Asia, at http://www.antislaverysociety.addr.com/slaverysasia.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
29
See, e.g., Jorge L. Carro, Regulation of Intercountry Adoption: Can the Abuses Come to an
End?, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 144 (1994) (stating that the U.S. embassy
investigating Romanian adoptions discovered “incidents where Romanian mothers
believed that they were merely ‘loaning’ their children to foreign parents and not
relinquishing them permanently”). Because of difficulties with ascertaining the actual
intent of parents who place children into orphanages, the Hague Convention on
Intercountry Adoption specifically requires counseling regarding “whether or not an
adoption will result in the termination of the legal relationship between the child and his or
26
27
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clearer, therefore, because the question of whose intent counts is critical
to the reach of the prohibition.
The second ambiguity in the Supplementary Slavery Convention’s
provision on children is the meaning of the term exploitation.
Unfortunately, this key term is not defined in the Supplementary Slavery
Convention.
One can assume that child prostitution or child
pornography would be forms of “exploitation,” but the meaning beyond
those obvious forms of exploitation is not so clear. Are all transfers in
which an individual under eighteen works considered an exploitation of
the child or his labor? And what about adoption: could adoption ever
be a form of exploitation?
The exploitation of children through labor or commercial sex are
elaborated in a number of legal instruments, such as the Convention
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of
the Worst Forms of Child Labour.30 Indeed, the development of the law
of “trafficking” concerning both women and children is directed
principally at trafficking for purposes of labor or sexual exploitation, due
to the notorious nature of these problems in the contemporary world.31
The problem of defining forms of “exploitation” beyond sex or labor is,
however, much more difficult. The problem is illustrated by the 2001
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, which is a supplement to the U.N.
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (“2001 Protocol”).32
The definition of “trafficking” in the 2001 Protocol both returns us to the
her family of origin.” Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, art. 4(c)(1), 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter
Hague Convention]. Absent such counseling, the consent of birth parents to an adoption
would apparently be invalid. Due to similar concerns, U.S. regulations governing who is
an orphan eligible for intercountry adoption note: “A child who is placed temporarily in
an orphanage shall not be considered to be abandoned if the parents express an intention to
retrieve the child, are contributing or attempting to contribute to the support of the child,
or otherwise exhibit ongoing parental interest in the child.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b) (2004).
30
Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of
the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161.
31
See, e.g., Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2000) (defining
“severe forms of trafficking in persons” as involving sex trafficking or trafficking for the
purposes of involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery); id. § 7101(b)
(finding that trafficking in persons is a modern form of slavery often involving the
“international sex trade” and also “forced labor” and “slavery-like labor”).
32
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children; Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc.
A/45/49 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Protocol].
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original problem of trying to define trafficking in children, while also
constituting an attempt to define the undefined term “exploitation” from
the Supplementary Slavery Convention provision on children. The 2001
Protocol definition states that “Trafficking in persons”:
[S]hall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat
or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction,
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum,
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs.33
In broad terms, the 2001 Protocol definition of human trafficking
contains three elements: (1) some transfer, harbouring or receipt of a
person; (2) by wrongful means, broadly defined to include coercion,
deception, abduction, abuse of power, or payment; and (3) for purposes
of exploitation. However, the 2001 Protocol specifies that trafficking in
persons exists when the first and third elements, transfer and
exploitation, are present, even if there are no wrongful means.34
This definition is broader than some definitions of trafficking
because it includes non-financial, but wrongful, transfers. In the end,
however, the definition hinges on the question of the purpose of the
transfer, which centers on the meaning of the term “exploitation.” The
definition of exploitation is helpful but deliberately open-ended; it gives
a “minimum” set of purposes deemed exploitative, while permitting the
list to be enlarged. The following list of minimum inclusions is primarily
familiar: (1) sexual exploitation; (2) forced labor; (3) slavery or practices
similar to slavery—presumably as defined in the 1926 Slavery
Convention and the 1995 Supplementary Slavery Convention; 4)
servitude; and 5) the removal of organs.35

33
34
35

Id.
Id. at art. (3)(c).
See id. at art. 3(a).
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Most of these named forms of “exploitation” would be typically
inapplicable to a situation where a child was sold for adoption. Children
placed in adoption are not being sold into sexual exploitation, forced
labor, or servitude. There have been recurrent rumors in sending
countries of children being “adopted” for their organs, but these
sensational and inflammatory allegations are generally regarded as
baseless.36 Thus, we are left, in this section, with a problem of circular
definitions. The Supplementary Slavery Convention defines the transfer
of children for purposes of exploitation as a practice similar to slavery,
and the 2001 Protocol defines exploitation to include practices similar to
slavery. Hence, the children are subject to a practice similar to slavery if
they are exploited, and they are exploited if they are subject to a practice
similar to slavery. Moreover, as we have seen, the sale of children for
adoption is apparently not a form of slavery itself because adopted
children are not slaves.
Although the 2001 Protocol leaves open the possibility of additional
unnamed forms of exploitation, it would be difficult to sustain the claim
that adoption itself is a form of exploitation. One could argue that an
adoptive parent “exploits” the child’s need of love and care to obtain a
child’s love and loyalty, but this seems strained. Using this kind of
reasoning, every possible kind of relationship could be deemed a form of
exploitation, and every mutually beneficial relationship could be labeled
a condemnable crime. More aptly, buying or stealing an infant or child
could be viewed as a kind of exploitation, but since these acts already
violate the elements of “trafficking” relating to the wrongful transfer, it
is difficult to see how they could also constitute the separate element of
exploitation. The definition of trafficking in the 2001 Protocol seems to
view a wrongful transfer of a human being as insufficient in itself to
constitute trafficking; rather, something more—an exploitative

36
See, e.g., CARP, FAMILY MATTERS, supra note 6, at 228 (noting, but dismissing as false,
“rumors” of intercountry adoption being used to run organ transplant rings); Carro, supra
note 29, at 128-31 (documenting the history of the rumor that internationally adopted
children were being used as organ banks, while noting that the U.S. government has
extensively investigated such claims and found them “baseless”); Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Ms. Ofelia CalcetasSantos, Addendum: Report on the Mission to Guatemala, Commission on Human Rights, 56th
Sess., Agenda Item 13, at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/73/Add.2 (2000) [hereinafter Report
on the Mission to Guatemala] (noting that “sensational” reports of organ selling in
Guatemala led to an arrest and riot, but that World Health Officials could not substantiate
allegations, and that “[s]ome individuals believe that the rumors were part of an
orchestrated campaign to foster resentment against foreigners, especially during the peace
negotiations”).
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purpose—is also required. And adoption, in itself, would not appear to
be an exploitative purpose.
This indeterminate tour of definitions of trafficking in persons,
women, or children would not be complete without a brief review of the
seminal Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”).37 The CRC
broadly condemns “the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for
any purpose or in any form,”38 but it does not contain any definition of
trafficking. The provisions of the CRC on intercountry adoption are
quite significant to defining standards for intercountry adoption, and
certainly buying children or otherwise obtaining them without proper
parental consent would violate those standards.39 The CRC, in itself,
however, does not answer the question of when these kinds of wrongs
constitute a form of child trafficking.
This preliminary review of both the dictionary meaning of “child
trafficking,” and the historical development of international legal norms
governing slavery and trafficking, reveals a paradox. On the one hand,
buying children and sending them across national boundaries would
seem to meet the dictionary definition of “trafficking in children,” even if
done as a part of an adoption. On a linguistic and intuitive level, buying
and selling children would seem to be included in any plausible
definition of “child trafficking.” On the other hand, the various
international legal definitions of slavery, practices similar to slavery, and
trafficking, seem to generally require something more than the sale of a
human being, and that “something more” is not met by sending the child
across national boundaries. These legal definitions of slavery, slaverylike practices, and trafficking seem to require intent or an act harmful to
the person enslaved or trafficked. The victim must be made a slave or
servant, subject to forced or exploitative labor, sexually exploited, or
involuntarily married. And generally speaking, the law would not
characterize being adopted as a harm, let alone a harm equivalent to
these serious forms of exploitation.
It is rational to construct a legal definition more narrowly than the
dictionary meaning of that same term, particularly when defining
serious penal wrongs or crimes. The law, in proscribing harms, generally
will aim its prohibitions at the worst and most relevant harms, while
37
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989) [hereinafter CRC].
38
Id. at art. 35.
39
For a discussion of the CRC and adoption, see Smolin, supra note 10.
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avoiding peripheral definitional issues. In the experience of society, the
central harms associated with slavery and trafficking have been chattel
slavery, forced labor, and trafficking in human beings for purposes of
exploitative sex or labor, and thus the legal definitions have required
these sorts of harms.
Characterizing all exchanges of children for money as illicit
trafficking would pose some surprisingly difficult issues for the law.
The difficulty, as the Supreme Court has famously explained in other
contexts, is that children “are always in some form of custody.”40 Thus,
any child custody transfer that is associated in any way with some
financial consideration can be characterized as the “sale of a child.”
Consider a typical divorce case in which one party drops a claim for
child custody in exchange for the other party accepting a lower financial
settlement. Though such divorce settlements are not explicitly presented
in a strict quid pro quo form, the substance of giving up a custodial claim
in exchange for a more favorable financial settlement may be all too
common.41 Even if one looks askance at this kind of situation, it would
seem extreme to label this kind of negotiation as illicit “child trafficking.”
As we will see, these difficulties in avoiding explicit or implicit sales
of children haunt even domestic adoption. For all these reasons, it is not
surprising that international law for many years defined “trafficking”
narrowly, and avoided characterizing all quid pro quo transactions
involving children as illicit child trafficking.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“[J]uveniles, unlike adults, are always in
some form of custody.”).
41
Justice Neely of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia cited the propensity
of such bargaining as a reason for the court to employ the more certain “primary caretaker”
presumption in child custody disputes, rather than the unpredictable multi-factor test.
Garska v. McCory, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981). Justice Neely stated:
The loss of children is a terrifying specter to concerned and loving
parents; however, it is particularly terrifying to the primary caretaker
parent who, by virtue of the caretaking function, was closest to the
child before the divorce. . . . Since the parent who is not the primary
caretaker is usually in the superior financial position, the subsequent
welfare of the child depends to a substantial degree upon the level of
support payments which are awarded in the course of a divorce. Our
experience instructs us that uncertainty about the outcome of custody
disputes leads to the irresistible temptation to trade the custody of the child
in return for lower alimony and child support payments. Since trial court
judges generally approve consensual agreements on child support,
underlying economic data which bear upon the equity of settlements
are seldom investigated at the time an order is entered.
Id. (emphasis added).
40
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B. International Definitions of Trafficking Specifically Addressing Adoption
1.

Adoption as the Prohibited Sale of a Child Under the 2000 Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography (“OP-CRC”).

In recent years, scandalous and illicit activities associated with
intercountry adoption, along with the growing ideological controversy
concerning intercountry adoption, have once again come to the attention
of the international community. Given the growing international
concern with child trafficking, the problem of abusive intercountry
adoption practices has increasingly been defined in terms of the
notorious problem of international child trafficking.42 Under these
circumstances, the gap between the common sense concept of child
trafficking and the strict legal definitions has become significant. Thus,
international legal materials have cautiously begun to specifically
address the question of when intercountry adoption has descended into
a form of illicit child trafficking. While these developments are likely
incomplete, they are significant.
The primary international document directly addressing
intercountry adoption as a form of child trafficking is the OP-CRC.43
Significantly, the United States has ratified the OP-CRC, even though it
has not ratified the CRC. Therefore, the OP-CRC is not merely
international law, but it constitutes international law that is binding
within the United States.44
The OP-CRC defines the “sale of children” as “any act or transaction
whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of persons to
42
The problem of abusive intercountry adoption practices, and in particular babyselling, has plagued the international community for decades. For a 1994 account of what
was, even by then, an old problem, see Carro, supra note 29, at 131-43 (documenting “baby
trafficking” problems in Peru, Brazil, Paraguay, Columbia, Honduras, Sri Lanka, and
Romania). Recent reports on the problem of trafficking sometimes include, to a modest
degree, adoption-related trafficking. See, e.g., THE PROTECTION PROJECT AT JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS,
ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE AMERICAS 41-43 (2000).
43
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Right of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 263, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/54/263 (2000) (entered into force Jan. 18, 2002) [hereinafter OP-CRC].
44
See Michael J. Dennis, Newly Adopted Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 789 (2000); Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Status of Ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, available at http://www.unhchr.
ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/status-opsc.htm (last modified Nov. 14, 2003).
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another for remuneration or any other consideration.”45 In defining the
situations where the “sale of children” must be legally prohibited, the
OP-CRC includes”[i]mproperly inducing consent, as an intermediary, for
the adoption of a child in violation of applicable international legal
instruments on adoption.”46 The term “applicable international legal
instruments on adoption” is understood to refer to the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption (“Hague Convention”).47 The
Hague Convention explicitly includes as one of its “objects” the
prevention of “the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children.”48
Although the Hague Convention contains no definition of the sale of, or
trafficking in, children, the OP-CRC has effectively made the Hague
Convention’s sections on consent to adoption into a critical part of the
definition of illicit child selling. Thus, where an intermediary induces
consent to adoption in a manner that violates the Hague standards, and a
child is transferred “for remuneration or any other consideration,” then
the illicit sale of a child has occurred. Moreover, although there is no
separate definition of “child trafficking,” the term presumably would
include any illicit sale of a child, particularly where the child is moved
geographically.
Thus, as a matter of international law, intercountry adoption
constitutes illicit child selling and child trafficking where an
intermediary induces consent to adoption in violation of the standards of
the Hague Convention and when the child is transferred for
remuneration or any consideration. As a technical matter, both
elements—inducement of consent by an intermediary in a manner
violating Hague standards and the transfer of children for remuneration
or consideration—must be established to constitute the kind of “sale of
children” that literally violates the standards of the OP-CRC.
The OP-CRC prohibition of adoption as illicit child selling contains
several apparent gaps. First, the prohibition, as literally written, does
OP-CRC, supra note 43, at art. 2(a).
Id. at art. 3(a)(ii).
47
See e.g., United Nations Treaty Collection, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, United
States of America: Ratification, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/CNs/2002/1301_
1400/1360E.doc (Jan. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Ratification OP-CRC] (stating that the United
States understands the term “applicable international legal instruments” to refer to Hague
Convention); Hague Convention, supra note 29; Dennis, supra note 44, at 793-94 (stating
that the United States and Japan understood “applicable international legal instruments on
adoption” to refer to Hague Convention).
48
Hague Convention, supra note 29, at pmbl., art. 1.
45
46
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not address situations where a child is taken from the birth family
without any consent whatsoever, as in instances of abduction or
kidnapping. In such instances, there has not been an improper
“inducing” of consent, and hence the OP-CRC is literally inapplicable,
even if the child is later sold. This situation would meet the OP-CRC
definition of the “sale of children” but would not meet the OP-CRC
definition of the prohibited sale of children. Second, the literal terms of
the OP-CRC require that an “intermediary” improperly induce consent
and therefore do not address situations where adoptive families directly
purchase children from birth parents without use of an intermediary. Of
course such wrongful acts violate the Hague Convention, and nations
should prohibit them. But the failure of the OP-CRC to include such
abusive adoption practices within its definition of illicit sale of children,
and thereby require penal sanctions for such practices, illustrates the
cautious, partial manner in which international law is beginning to
address abusive adoption practices.
2.

Hague Standards for Valid Consent to Adoption as Applicable to the
OP-CRC

The Hague Convention standards for a valid consent to adoption are
extensive and yet are ultimately a matter of broadly-held ethical
adoption standards. The standards have three requirements for consent
by those, like birth parents, with custodial responsibilities and rights in
relation to the child. First, those parents giving consent to adoption must
have received the equivalent of informed consent, including counseling
“as necessary,” and being informed as to the legal effect of the consent,
“in particular whether or not an adoption will result in the termination
of the legal relationship between the child and his or her family of
origin.”49 Second, the consent must not have “been induced by payment
or compensation of any kind and have not been withdrawn.”50 Third,
consent must be given “freely, in the required legal form, and expressed
or evidenced in writing.”51
It is clear, therefore, that “inducing” birth family members to
relinquish children for adoption through the payment of money would
violate the terms of the Hague Convention. Moreover, such “inducing”
monetary payments would also appear to constitute the separate
definition of “sale of children,” under the OP-CRC, because they
49
50
51

Id. at art. 4, 5(b).
Id.
Id.
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constitute the transfer of the child for “remuneration or any other
consideration.”52 Hence, where an intermediary induces consent to
adoption through monetary payments or financial benefit, such acts
would clearly constitute the prohibited sale of children under the OPCRC.
In addition, where an intermediary obtains consent to adoption from
a birth family through fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, failure to
provide necessary counseling, or failure to disclose the legal effect of the
consent, such adoption would also constitute a prohibited “sale of a
child” under the OP-CRC where the child was transferred for
“remuneration or any other consideration.” Such remuneration or
consideration could occur, moreover, in a subsequent transfer of the
child not involving the original birth parents. Children are often
transferred multiple times, passing from an individual who obtains the
child from the birth parent to an orphanage, perhaps passing from one
orphanage to another, and then passing from the orphanage to the
adoptive parents overseas.
If any of these transfers involve
consideration paid for the transfer, and the original consent was illicit,
then under the OP-CRC the sale of a child (and child trafficking) has
occurred.
3.

Money as the Root of All Evil (or Much Uncertainty) Under the OPCRC and the Hague Convention

We have seen that the developing international law definitions of
illicit child trafficking, or the sale of children, do not yet address all
situations within the common sense or dictionary definition of those
terms. The law has been reluctant to label all sales of children as
prohibited forms of child trafficking and has failed to demand penal
sanctions for all abusive adoption practices. Yet, it is encouraging that
the law has been moving in the direction of clearly labeling certain
abusive adoption practices as prohibited forms of child trafficking or sale
of children. Certainly, it seems to be the intent of the OP-CRC to clearly
and definitively label some abusive adoption practices as the illicit sale
of children subject to penal sanction.
Unfortunately, further analysis will demonstrate that the kinds of
wrongs addressed by the OP-CRC, which involve an illicit transfer of a
child for “remuneration or other consideration,” are not effectively
prohibited by law. The difficulty, as we shall see, is that the law is not in
52
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a position to clearly differentiate, in the context of adoption, between licit
and illicit payments of money. Once the law loses its capacity to
distinguish clearly between prohibited and permitted provisions of
financial benefit, the effectiveness of legal prohibitions against the “sale
of children” virtually collapses.
Under the OP-CRC, there are essentially two points at which illicit
consideration may be involved: (1) in inducing consent to adoption; or
(2) in a subsequent transfer of the child. In both instances, difficulties
arise from the fact that payment of money in itself may be viewed as
customary and licit. Upon closer examination, distinguishing between
licit and illicit payment of money in each instance may be difficult, not
only theoretically but also in practice.
C. Inducing Consent from Birth Parents
1.

The Domestic Adoption System Creates an Unstable Baseline for
Distinguishing Between Licit and Illicit Payments of Money

The letter and spirit of international law, and domestic law within
the United States, forbids the payment of money or other consideration
to birth parents to induce relinquishment of the child or consent to
adoption. Such payments are tantamount to buying a child. However,
state laws governing domestic adoption within the United States
generally permit the provision of very significant “birth parent
expenses,” including temporary living expenses, medical expenses, and
counseling fees. These payments are viewed as a gift, rather than legal
consideration for consent to adoption. Indeed, payment of such
expenses in most states cannot be conditioned, or made reimbursable,
based upon the birth mother actually consenting to the adoption.
Moreover, birth parents cannot be bound to any pre-birth agreement to
relinquish or place their child.53

53
The state of law and practice regarding money and domestic adoption is far messier
than can be summarized in this section. However, for useful material see National
Adoption Information Clearinghouse, 2003 Adoption State Statute Series Statute-at-a-Glance,
State Regulation of Adoption Expenses, available at http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/
statutes/expenses.cfm (last updated July 23, 2004) [hereinafter NAIC Adoption Expenses];
see also ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1988 & Supp. 2004); CYNTHIA
D. MARTIN & DRU MARTIN GROVES, BEATING THE ADOPTION ODDS 156-61 (1998); PERTMAN,
supra note 5, at 38-43, 185-208; Avi Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1986); Sara L. Johnson, Annotation, Validity of Agreements to
Pay Expenses Attendant on Birth of Child on Condition That Natural Parents Consent to Adoption
of Child, 43 A.L.R. 4TH 935 (1986 & Supp. 2004).
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The net effect of these rules in practice is unclear and casts a certain
ethical cloud over domestic adoption. The intent of the law is to
prohibit, and generally even criminalize, the sale of children. In practice,
however, prospective adoptive parents provide financial assistance to
birth parents, directly or through intermediaries, precisely based on the
hope and expectation of obtaining the child. Certainly most prospective
adoptive parents lack the funds or motivation to lavish financial
assistance on birth mothers for the mere sake of compassion or kindness.
Everyone understands that prospective adoptive parents are, in crude
terms, “in it for the baby.” The fact that the birth parents are free to
accept the aid, and then ultimately keep the baby, does not ultimately
change the truth that the assistance is provided at least in the hope that
the birth parents will relinquish the child. Indeed, such assistance could
be compared to a “right of first refusal” real property contract in which
the owners become contractually obligated, if they sell property, to offer
it first to a particular individual. Prospective adoptive parents who
provide aid to birth parents are assuming that if the child is relinquished,
they will be offered the child. Since a “right of first refusal” provision for
property is commonly made binding by financial consideration, it would
appear that the aid provided to birth mothers really is a form of legal
consideration.54
The self-contradictory nature of the law is illustrated by California
law, which simultaneously criminalizes both paying a birth parent to
consent to adoption and a birth parent accepting benefits from
prospective adoptive parents with the intent to not complete the
adoption.55 Logically, the net effect of California law is to turn every
provision of financial assistance by adoptive parents to birth parents into
the sale of a child. The adoptive parents’ “consideration” is the financial
payment; the birth parents’ corollary consideration is the representation,
under California law, that upon receipt of such benefits they sincerely
intend to place their child with the adoptive family. The birth parents’
legal rights to genuinely “change their minds” about adoption does not
alter the fact that the present intent to place the child serves as a kind of
consideration for the receipt of financial benefit. The birth mother, in

Regarding the law of “right of first refusal” contracts, see 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 11.3-.4 (1996 & Supp. 2004). Another way of addressing the
obligations created by financial payments to birth parents would be through the doctrine of
a “contract to bargain.” See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 673 (1969).
55
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 2004).
54
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essence, is paid for a truthful representation of intent to place her child
with a particular family.
An additional benefit to birth mothers, that of education expenses,
has been specifically prohibited in some states and would appear to fall
outside the range of permissible adoption expenses in most states.56
However, adoption intermediaries nonetheless find a way of offering
“scholarships” as a kind of implicit inducement, by creating and
publicizing “scholarship” programs for birth mothers who place their
children for adoption.57 Since the award of such “scholarships”
generally would occur after the adoption, and are not necessarily
guaranteed, the award would presumably escape the oversight of the
courts that issue adoption decrees and review permissible forms of
adoption expenses. Thus, although more than a decade ago the
provision of a college scholarship to a birth mother was seen as a sign of
an illegal black market adoption,58 today adoption intermediaries openly
tout their scholarship programs in their internet appeals to birth
mothers.59 Presumably these intermediaries have been advised that so
long as the scholarship is not formally guaranteed, no illegal inducement
is present.
The perception that children are being implicitly bought and sold
within the domestic adoption system is furthered by the common
practice of private agencies charging vastly different sums based on the
race of the child. Thus, it might cost thirty-thousand dollars to adopt a
white infant but only ten-thousand dollars to adopt an African-American
infant.60 Further, agencies charge extra for finding an infant quickly.61 It

See NAIC Adoption Expenses, supra note 53.
See American Adoptions, at http://www.americanadoptions.com/pregnant/
scholarship (last visited Oct. 29, 2004) (describing “Birth Mother Scholarship Program”);
Lifetime Adoption Facilitation Center, at http://www.lifetimeadoption.com/for_
birthmothers/bmresources.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004); Lifetime Adoption Foundation,
at http://www.lifetimefoundation.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2004) (advertising educational
scholarships under their “Lifetime Adoption Foundation,” a nonprofit 501(c)(3) charity).
58
See William Pierce & Robert J. Vitillo, Independent Adoptions and the ‘Baby Market,’ in
ADOPTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 131, 140 (Euthymia D. Hibbs ed., 1991).
59
See supra note 57.
60
See Dean Schabner, ‘Buying and Selling,’ Preacher Calls Adoption Fees Discriminatory,
(Mar. 12, 2004) at http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=91834&page=1. This problem of
differential fees based on race is not a new problem. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Spare
Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 913, 918 (1994) (describing her
own son’s adoption, with offer of a differential fee scale for “older, black, and other
handicapped children”). Of course Judge Posner had discussed these issues much earlier.
See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
56
57

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 [2004], Art. 1

306

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

can be hard to see why the legitimate birth parent expenses and
professional services would vary so substantially based on the race of the
child or the speed of the adoption. Whatever the explanations offered
for such charges, the effect is to create a market in babies, with highdemand characteristics of the infant (race, youth, and health) or the
adoption speed of the adoption being allocated to the highest bidder.
This contradicts the legal conception that adoption is guided principally
by the best interests of the child, with money limited to the subsidiary
role of providing reasonable fees for services.
Occasionally, a decision from the courts makes the existence of an
exchange of money for child patently clear. Thus, in Gorden v. Cutler62 a
Pennsylvania court concluded that a contract between the birth and
prospective adoptive parents had existed:
As the negotiations for the proposed adoption
progressed, counsel recalled how he told the natural
father ‘that [his] clients were willing to pay the medical
expenses on condition that he [the natural father] sign a
consent to adoption.’
This same condition was
communicated on several occasions to the natural
mother. . . . Finally, as it appears on the record, counsel
characterized the moment at which the custodial
exchange occurred in the hospital dispassionately, as
would occur in the culmination of any business
transaction. He stated it as: ‘They signed. I paid the
bills, and they then turned the baby over to me.’ We
find the aforesaid to be, in its simple form, descriptive of
a contract, i.e., an offer, acceptance and consideration.63
In this case, the birth parents subsequently changed their minds, and
successfully obtained the return of their child prior to the filing of the
adoption papers.64 The disappointed prospective adoption parents
thereupon sued for reimbursement of the childbirth expenses they had
provided to the birth parents, including hospital and physician costs
associated with the birth mother’s pregnancy, delivery, and care of the

61
Schabner, supra note 60 (noting that a “non-black baby” in nine to eighteen months
costs nineteen thousand dollars to twenty-four thousand dollars, but twenty-seven
thousand dollars to thirty-six thousand dollars in three to nine months).
62
471 A.2d 449, 455 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 450.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/1

Smolin: Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking

2004]

Adoption as Child Trafficking

307

child.65 The lower court found the contract unenforceable as a matter of
public policy, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed, finding
the contract enforceable and the birth parents responsible to reimburse
the prospective adoptive parents.66 The court agreed that a “contract
wherein a mother of a child agrees to adoption of her child by another in
consideration of a monetary consideration to herself is void against
public policy.”67 However, the court held that such contracts were
proper where “the monetary consideration is to flow to the child.”68
Somehow, the hospital expenses associated with childbirth were then
characterized by the court as not only benefiting the child but also as “in
no way inured to the benefit of the natural mother.”69 Thus, the Court
was able to conclude that the contract in question was valid, despite the
ban on exchanging monetary consideration for consent to adoption,
because none of the monetary consideration benefited the mother.70
Gorden is apparently unusual in its willingness to require birth
parents to reimburse medical expenses to disappointed prospective
adoptive parents.
Gorden is also somewhat unusual in its
straightforward acknowledgement and acceptance of a contract in which
financial benefit is exchanged for consent to adoption. Gorden’s
conclusion that the mother does not financially benefit when childbirth
expenses are paid is so incredible that it must be accounted as a mere
legal fiction. First, no one could miss the fact that hospital and medical
charges for childbirth include fees for medical care of the mother, as well
as the child. Second, it obviously benefits parents when someone pays
the medical expenses of their children, since parents are legally
responsible to pay their children’s medical expenses. Thus, the court
employed a legal fiction to validate a contract involving the exchange of
financial benefit to the mother, in exchange for the mother’s consent to
the adoption. The court in Gorden refused to indulge in the more
common legal fiction that medical expenses provided to birth mothers by
prospective adoptive parents are mere “gifts”; instead, it employed the
even more ludicrous fiction that the payment of pregnancy and
childbirth expenses is not a financial benefit to the birth mother. The
court’s choice of a more unusual legal fiction was apparently motivated
by a desire to see the prospective adoptive parents reimbursed, a result
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
Id. at 452-59.
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that could not be obtained by calling their provision of medical expenses
a “gift.”
The confusion of the courts is illustrated by subsequent cases in
Pennsylvania that cite Gorden for the proposition that the state has a
strong public policy against selling children. Thus, in justifying the
judicial reduction of intermediary adoption fees, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court invoked the memory of slavery and the civil war, and
then lamented:
By now the practice should be so abhorrent to every
American that no one would traffic in human life for
profit. Unfortunately, the lessons of the past are already
forgotten; and due to the current small supply of babies
available for adoption relative to the demand for those
infants by prospective parents who are ready to pay, if
they must, to get an infant, our society has experienced a
degree of principle-shifting.71
In support of these brave words, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
then cited Gorden for the proposition that contracts contrary to public
policy would not be enforced,72 apparently oblivious to that decision’s
use of a legal fiction to enforce a contract exchanging money for the birth
parents’ consent to adoption.
The difficulties of the legal system in defining and enforcing the
principle against selling children has been accentuated by the emergence
of various alternative reproductive technologies, including, particularly,
various forms of surrogacy. The question of whether surrogacy contracts
should be evaluated under the principles of adoption statutes
prohibiting baby-selling has received a variety of answers. Although the
better and more common answer would appear to be that surrogacy for
a fee is illegal, the answer is not universal, as it varies according to
whether the “surrogate” mother is the genetic mother and still leaves
room for providing generous “expenses.”73 The net result is a booming
In re Adoption of B.A.B., 534 A.2d 1050, 1052 (Pa. 1987).
See id.
73
See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that a gestational surrogate
mother is not a mother under California law, and therefore gestational surrogacy contracts
are not subject to adoption statutes and do not violate public policy); MARTHA A. FIELD,
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1990); Ann M. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody, in 1 ABUSE
AND ADOPTION CASES §§ 9.13–.18 (1993 & Supp. 2003); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching
Surrogate Motherhood: Reconsidering Difference, 26 VT. L. REV. 407 (2002).
71
72
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business in surrogacy, which as advertised on the internet involves very
substantive payments to “surrogate” mothers and can prove more
expensive than even a high-end conventional adoption.74
Given all of the confusion regarding the current role of money in
domestic infant adoption, it should not be surprising that one author, a
psychologist and adoptive parent specializing in adoption and family
issues, finally concluded that “black market adoptions are not much
different from our current adoption practices.”75
Based on this
conclusion, this popular guide to adoption proposed that the black
market be legalized, to “allow the mother and those involved with
arranging adoptions to make a profit.”76 Similarly, although Judge
Posner’s proposal for creating an infant adoption77 has become
notorious, he plausibly defended his proposal by arguing that he was
merely proposing to make the existing legal “market in babies” more
efficient and equitable. Thus, Judge Posner argued that the “element of a
sale” exists in private agency adoptions due to the provision of expenses
to the birth mother, and is “even more transparent” in independent
adoptions.78 Although it would be possible to allow for the provision of
birth parent expenses in a way that was clearly different from Judge
Posner’s proposal that birth mothers sell their parental rights to the
highest bidder, within our current law and practice it is not always easy
to discern the difference.
2.

Money and Birth Parents in the Intercountry Adoption System

The ethical and legal paradoxes of the domestic adoption system
within the United States create an unstable baseline for evaluating when
intercountry adoption has descended into trafficking or the sale of
children. This uncertain baseline causes many to come to intercountry
adoption, believing that it is normal to pay birth mothers large amounts
of money, and with a hazy sense as to when such financial provision
becomes illicit. Thus, one reporter investigating a major baby-buying
74
See, e.g., Surrogate Alternatives, Inc., at http://www.surrogatealternatives.com/fees.
htm (last visited Oct 29, 2004); Center for Surrogate Parenting, Inc., at
http://www.creatingfamilies.com/Costai.HTML (last visited October 29, 2004).
75
MARTIN & GROVES, supra note 53, at 162. The statement was apparently not meant as a
condemnation of the current system, but rather as a part of an argument for legalizing the
black market. Id. at 162-70.
76
Id. at 167.
77
The original proposal is found in Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUDIES 323, 347 (1978).
78
See Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 60
(1987).
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scandal in Cambodia found that some minimized the concern over
payments made to Cambodian birthmothers, by pointing out that
“privately arranged adoptions in the United States often require
adoptive parents to pay a birth mother’s medical and living expenses, up
to tens of thousands of dollars, during and after pregnancy.” Under this
line of reasoning, some maintained that it should be legitimate to give a
poor birth parent in Cambodia “some money so that she can properly
look after the rest of her family.”79
This lack of a clear domestic adoption baseline is unfortunate,
because the financial aspects of intercountry adoption involve distinctive
and troubling ethical dilemmas. Indeed, in nations where poverty is
often an inducing factor in relinquishments, the entire question of money
is a quagmire.
The first issue is whether financial assistance toward keeping the
family together must be offered prior to accepting a relinquishment.
Given that many birth mothers will be among the segment of humanity
living on less than two dollars per day—and some among those living
on less than one dollar per day—it could be argued that relatively small
amounts of money might help keep the child with the birth family.80
Indeed, it may be that the travel expenses involved in an intercountry
adoption would be more than sufficient to avoid relinquishment, if such
a sum were available to assist the birth family rather than to remove the
child. Thus, it could be argued that consent to intercountry adoption
should only be considered valid where financial assistance to keep the
child with the birth family was offered and available. As an ethical
matter, it is perverse to spend thousands of dollars taking a child from
the birth family, when a much smaller sum would have kept the family
intact.
Neither the OP-CRC nor the Hague Convention, however, require
the offer or availability of such financial assistance to birth families to
validate consent to adoption. It is legal to accept the relinquishment of a
child for purposes of intercountry adoption even where the provision of

See Sara Corbett, Where Do Babies Come FROM?, N.Y TIMES, June 16, 2002, at 42.
For commentary on the role of poverty in contributing to relinquishments in various
nations, see generally Smolin, supra note 10 (India); see also Corbett, supra note 79
(Cambodia); Robin McDowell, Cambodian Babies Still Sold for Adoption, BIRMINGHAM NEWS,
March 7, 2004, at 6A (Cambodia); Robin McDowell, Poor Cambodians Selling Babies, THE
TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), March 7, 2004, at A10 [hereinafter McDowell, Poor Cambodians]
(Cambodia); Report on the Mission to Guatemala, supra note 36 (Guatemala).
79
80
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a very modest sum of assistance would have kept the child with the birth
family.
From a legal perspective, therefore, the financial issues related to
relinquishment only arise when birth parents receive some kind of
money or assistance. Under the combined standards of the OP-CRC and
the Hague Convention, any amount of remuneration or consideration
that “induces” consent to adoption is sufficient to constitute child selling.
This rule is important, particularly given reports of birth families being
induced to relinquish children for as little as twenty dollars.81 When
such small sums actually are “inducements,” however, proof and
enforcement issues become difficult. Even if it is possible to document
the receipt of money and corollary relinquishment by a birth parent—a
difficult matter, when such small sums are involved, and intermediaries
to send and receive are available—the distinction between assistance and
inducement can be difficult to define. Given a poverty-stricken birth
parent, the failure to provide some small amount of assistance would
seem itself a cruelty, and yet once such assistance is given it can be
difficult to tell whether it served as an inducement.82
Unfortunately, the international rules governing consent to adoption
are not prophylactic, in that they permit situations where inducement is
likely. For example, the international rules apparently allow aid to be
offered only to those birth parents who relinquish their children, rather
than requiring aid to birth parents to be unconditional. Thus, the
international rules permit patterns of aid that create incentives to
relinquish. It is only an actual inducement that is apparently illegal. The
difficulty with this rule is that proof of an inducement, or a quid pro quo,
ultimately turns on the inner motivations and understanding of the
parties. Because birth parents frequently will not be cooperative with
investigative authorities, given their own legal, social, and financial
vulnerabilities, proof of inducement will often be difficult even where
81
See McDowell, Poor Cambodians, supra note 80 (noting that Cambodian birth mothers
received as little as twenty dollars from intermediaries); Smolin, supra note 10 (citing T.
Sunil Reddy, Rescued Children Fight Diseases, Face a Future of Uncertainty, INDIA EXPRESS,
April 4, 1999, at 1) (noting birth parents in India are paid as little as fifteen dollars by
intermediaries).
82
See Ethica, Child Trafficking: Why Can’t the Immigration Service Prove It?, (June 6, 2003),
available at http://www.ethicanet.org/INEvidence.PDF [hereinafter Ethica] (reviewing
specific U.S. government investigations of alleged child trafficking in intercountry
adoption). Ethica is an organization that advocates for ethical adoption. This author has
been on advisory boards of this organization but had no role in creating the article cited
herein.
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children were in fact sold. If the “buyer and seller” (agency and birth
parent) maintain their story that no sale occurred but that the consent to
adoption and provision of assistance were each independent acts, proof
of inducement becomes extraordinarily difficult even where receipt of
money is proven.83
Indeed, under the official U.S. interpretation of the OP-CRC, proof of
a willful and knowing intent to induce consent through compensation is
required to constitute a violation of the OP-CRC’s ban on the illicit sale
of children.84 Under this interpretation, an adoption may be lawful
under the OP-CRC even if the provision of money to a birth parent
actually induced relinquishment. It is not enough to prove that the birth
parents thought they were selling their baby; one must also prove that
those receiving the child willfully and knowingly purchased the child.
Thus, a well-intentioned system of assistance to relinquishing birth
parents that inadvertently induces consent does not constitute the illicit
sale of children.
Intercountry adoption largely mirrors the ethical dilemmas of
domestic adoption in which financial consideration inducing consent to
adoption is condemned, but non-inducing “gifts” of assistance, even
directed only to relinquishing birth parents, are apparently permissible.85
The issue is aggravated in intercountry adoption by the extreme poverty
of many birth parents in developing nations that face a severe struggle to
obtain the very barest necessities of food, water, clothing, and shelter for
themselves and their children. Under these circumstances, it becomes
much more likely that the possibility of a small “gift” could in fact
induce relinquishment.86 Indeed, in some developing nation contexts a
“gift” of one hundred dollars might be more likely to “induce” consent
to adoption than would a “gift” of fifty-thousand dollars within the
United States. Thus, a systematic program of assistance for birth parents,
where aid was conditioned on relinquishment, would be likely to have
the effect of inducing relinquishments in a significant percentage of
cases. The conclusion that inadvertent child buying does not constitute
See id.
See Ratification OP-CRC, supra note 47, at art. 3 (noting that the United States
understands that the term “improperly inducing consent” in Article 3(1)(a)(ii) of the
Protocol means knowingly and willfully inducing consent by offering or giving
compensation for the relinquishment of parental rights).
85
Ethica, supra note 82 (noting that the Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MANUAL 42.21 N13.7, states that investigating officers “must take into account the fact that
some payment of expenses is allowed under the law”).
86
See supra note 80.
83
84
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an illicit “sale of children” would leave the door wide open to abusive
adoption practices, making enforcement of the norm against child selling
all but illusory.
Despite these difficulties, some violators of the ban on buying infants
act so flagrantly and notoriously that enforcement should be possible.
Thus, as adoption intermediaries systematically make it known among
birth parents that they are in the market for buying children, and
themselves employ or rely on further intermediaries, the quid pro quo
aspects of intentionally paying money for children becomes
unmistakable. Even then, however, it may be difficult to prove the sale
of a child in each individual case, at least so long as the birth parents fail
to admit that they “sold” their baby.87
The intercountry adoption system should create a rule forbidding all
assistance to birth parents that is conditioned on relinquishment or
placement of the child. This kind of prophylactic rule would clarify, to
some degree, the critical distinction between assistance and buying
children. There is precedent for such a rule within the domestic
adoption system, although the international ban would have to be
broader and clearer than the domestic ban to be effective. Until the
international adoption system adopts such a rule, it will be difficult to
prevent both notorious and inadvertent inducement to relinquish.
In the longer term, the intercountry adoption system should require
that birth parents be offered some degree of financial help to keep the
child with the family. Under this rule, a relinquishment or consent to
adoption by a birth parent to a licensed agency would only be valid
within the intercountry adoption system if the birth parents had been
offered a certain measure of financial assistance to keep the family intact.
The amount offered could be relatively modest—for example,
approximately one hundred U.S. dollars for adoptions in nations like
India, Cambodia, and Guatemala, where relinquishing parents often
earn less than two dollars per day. The funds would come from
intercountry adoption fees.
Such a rule could help rebut the charge that intercountry adoption
between rich and poor countries exploits the economic vulnerability of
87
Thus, in the Andhra Pradesh, India, Guatemala, and Cambodian adoption scandals,
many concluded that baby-selling was occurring, and shutdowns or moratoriums
sometimes have occurred, but it was still rare to find any individual cases in which a court
found that a particular infant had been illicitly purchased.
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the poor in order to meet the desire of the rich for children. While a rule
requiring modest assistance toward keeping the family intact would not
entirely rebut this charge, it would reduce the instances where the
children were relinquished solely for financial reasons. Without such a
rule, the intercountry adoption system would continue to permit the
cruel practice of spending tens of thousands of dollars to take a child
from his birth parents, while being unwilling to provide any assistance,
not a single dollar, to help the child remain with his parents.
D.

Money and Intermediaries

Where the birth parents’ consent to adoption is illicit in a nonfinancial way, for example through coercion, fraud, or
misrepresentation, the adoption violates the standards of the Hague
Convention.88 Such a violation of the Hague Convention, however, is
insufficient in itself to render the adoption an illicit “sale of children”
under the OP-CRC standards because it does not constitute the sale of a
child.89 However, if such a wrongful taking of a child through nonfinancial means is followed by the subsequent transfer of the child for
“remuneration or any other consideration,” then under the OP-CRC the
adoption would constitute an illicit “sale of a child.”90 We might call
such a subsequent transfer of the child a “downstream sale,” because the
sale occurs after the child has already been (wrongfully) taken from the
birth parents.
This question of a “downstream sale” of a child requires inquiry into
the quagmire of money and adoption intermediaries. Commonly,
adoption intermediaries are both paid and they transfer the child. The
difficulty therefore becomes determining when these two related events
constitute the “transfer” of a child for “remuneration or any other
consideration,” as described in the OP-CRC.
Once again, the domestic adoption system creates a problematic
point of comparison. Despite the concern within the domestic adoption
system of profiteering by adoption intermediaries, it has been
permissible for such intermediaries to receive substantial payments. The
theory of such payments appears to vary with the kind of intermediary,
but the common theme is that intermediaries may be paid reasonable
and customary fees for services provided. Permissible services include
88
89
90
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counseling, home studies, social and medical histories, and attorney fees.
Payment for obtaining a consent to adoption or placement of a child is
generally forbidden.91
These rules are designed to ensure that
placements are made in the best interests of children, rather than made
through a market process in which children are allocated to the highest
bidder regardless of the appropriateness of the adoption.
The context for these payments for “services” is a domestic system
for infant adoption dominated by private agencies and intermediaries.
Public agencies primarily place older children who have come into state
custody through allegations of abuse or neglect. These private agencies
and intermediaries have created a diverse and somewhat entrepreneurial
environment, which includes religious and social service agencies
broadly involved in human services, as well as entities and persons
specialized in adoption. The competitive environment for these entities
can be difficult, since entry into the field appears wide-open. While the
persons working in the field include social workers and lawyers,
professional credentials are not required, and the most critical attribute
may be the capacity to find or attract birth parents.92
Domestic adoption within the United States has been radically
altered by the relative empowerment of birth parents of healthy infants.
Since more than ninety-five percent of single birth parents either abort or
keep the child, and only a small percentage offer the child for adoption,
birth parents find themselves courted by agencies, intermediaries, and
prospective adoptive parents. Large numbers of prospective adoptive
parents seek a much smaller number of available infants through
advertisements to birth parents. These advertisements offer birth
parents free counseling, financial assistance, college scholarships,
detailed information on prospective adoptive families, and open
adoption. In addition, the reduction of social stigma for single
parenthood has further empowered birth parents, making the option of
keeping their baby or openly interviewing prospective adoptive parents
generally available. Under these circumstances, birth parents are no
longer limited to a shame-faced relinquishment of their child to an allpowerful intermediary. While this empowerment of the birth family
opens the door to certain kinds of abuse—principally related to a
bidding war for scarce babies—it reduces to some degree the capacity of
See NAIC Adoption Expenses, supra note 53.
See Pierce & Vitillo, supra note 58, at 131; Evan B. Donaldson Institute, Private Domestic
Adoption Facts, available at https://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/domestic_
print.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Evan B. Donaldson Institute].
91
92

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 [2004], Art. 1

316

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

intermediaries to use the cloaks of privacy and power to profiteer for
themselves. On the other hand, the empowerment of birth parents
means that intermediaries who can attract birth parents will tend to
dominate, regardless of professional competencies or official
credentials.93
The intercountry adoption system is similarly dominated by private
intermediaries, but here the picture becomes even more complex. Unlike
domestic adoption, where the capacity to find birth parents as clients is
critical, the most significant client for intercountry adoption is the
adoptive family.
Thus, whereas domestic infant adoption
advertisements are aimed at birth parents, in intercountry adoption the
ads are aimed at adoptive families. Agencies tout their capacity to
reliably and quickly deliver healthy infants to adoptive parents: “Want a
baby?—we’ll get you a healthy Guatemalan infant in less than a year!”
Clients weary of chasing picky birth parents within the domestic system,
put off by the specter of birth parents changing their minds before or
after birth, and ambivalent about open adoption, are lured into the
international system by the comparative powerlessness and distance of
foreign birth parents. Well-meaning families who already have children
are drawn into intercountry adoption by the plea to provide homes for
the destitute orphans of the world that are presented as being virtually
limitless in number. The regulatory environment for intermediaries
working in intercountry adoption varies significantly from state to state,
but can be summarized, overall, as quite lax, making professional
credentials optional.
In intercountry adoption, as in domestic adoption, the theory is that
adoptive parents are paying for “services,” and perhaps “gifts” to others,
but they are not buying a child. The nature of those “services” and
“gifts” within intercountry adoption remains quite obscure, however,
due to the vague breakdown of intercountry adoption fees. Intercountry
adoption can be quite expensive, but it is not always clear exactly where
the money is going. Fees are often broadly designated as “agency fees,”
“international fees,” or fees going to those within the foreign nation (i.e.,
“India Fee”). In many intercountry adoptions, all of the fees are paid by
the adoptive parents to the U.S. placement entity, which then channels
portions to various entities and persons within the sending nation. In
some countries, the adoptive parents are required to bring significant
93
See generally CARP, FAMILY MATTERS, supra note 6, at 196-222 (discussing the
development of open adoption); PERTMAN, supra note 5 (discussing general changes in
adoption); Evan B. Donaldson Institute, supra note 92 (discussing attracting birth parents).
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amounts of cash with them into the foreign nation, and pay various
entities directly. In either event, it is common for five thousand dollars
to ten-thousand dollars per child to be paid to various individuals,
agencies, and entities within the foreign nation. When this kind of
money goes to nations with per capita incomes of less than one thousand
dollars, often less than five hundred dollars, it becomes extraordinarily
difficult to prevent adoption from descending into a form of child
trafficking. I have elsewhere described at great length how the Indian
adoption system has been corrupted by large amounts of American
dollars, but doubtless the story could be repeated in the various nations
plagued by adoption scandals.94
The various entities and individuals involved in intercountry
adoption, who may receive fees, include (1) U.S. placement agencies; (2)
U.S. agencies providing home study of adoptive family; (3) orphanages
or agencies in the foreign country with custody of child; (4) various
“facilitators,” employees of United States or foreign agencies, who move
adoptions through the foreign system; (5) attorneys in foreign nations;
(6) possible “foster parents” in foreign countries; (7) medical
professionals providing medical evaluations of children; and (8) social
workers providing social histories or child study forms. Of course there
are also various official immigration and court fees, in addition to travel
costs, which add to the cost of intercountry adoption, but generally
provide far less room for mischief.
As a practical matter, the U.S. practice of spending five thousand
dollars to ten-thousand dollars per child in the foreign countries
generally creates a large “profit” or excess beyond any actual, legitimate
costs related to adoption services. Indeed, in nations where social
workers traditionally earn a few thousand dollars per year, and
orphanage workers can be paid a few dollars a day or less, it seems
probable that the vast bulk of the fees are sheer profits. The ultimate
destinations of these profits seem to vary from nation to nation. Some
argue that the Chinese, with their centralized systems of control, have
successfully used most of their adoption fees to significantly improve
their orphanages and services for abandoned children, most of whom
will remain in China.95 By contrast, in Guatemala, India, and Cambodia,

See Smolin, supra note 10.
See KAY ANN JOHNSON, WANTING A DAUGHTER, NEEDING A SON: ABANDONMENT,
ADOPTION, AND ORPHANAGE CARE IN CHINA 183-211 (Amy Klatzkin ed., 2004).
94
95
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The Hague Convention specifically requires contracting States to
take “all appropriate measures to prevent improper financial or other
gain in connection with an adoption . . . .”97 But what is “improper”
gain? The best definition would include compensation disproportionate
to services rendered, based on the Hague Convention’s prohibition of
remuneration that “is unreasonably high in relation to services
rendered.”98 For example, if an individual in a developing nation spends
ten hours working on an adoption, and a person in his field (social work,
child welfare, law, etc.) would normally receive two hundred dollars for
such work, then receipt of three thousand dollars beyond expenses
should count as “improper” gain.
One difficulty with enforcing such a norm is that the foreign
agencies and individuals receiving “adoption fees” often claim that those
sums are funding an orphanage, including the costs of caring for
children who will never be adopted. In many instances there does not
seem to be a clear system of accountability to determine the degree to
which such fees are truly spent on child welfare or are simply to enrich
individuals. In those circumstances, it becomes very difficult to
document whether the “profit” is used to fund the operation of the
orphanage or is pocketed by the individual.99
Even if the amounts paid to particular individuals are
disproportionately high, and within the Hague Convention’s
prohibition of “improper financial gain,” they are not necessarily within
the OP-CRC definition of a sale of a child. In order to come within the
definition of a “sale” of a child, there must be the following two elements
beyond the receipt of some consideration: (1) transferring the child; and
(2) in exchange for, or in consideration for, the receipt of consideration.
The first element is met only when the individual at some point had
physical or legal custody of the child. Even where that element is met,
however, the element of exchange of the child for money is problematic.
Consider a typical situation where a corrupt individual (“Mr. K.”) in
a sending nation obtains physical custody of a child in some nonSee note 79.
Hague Convention, supra note 29, at art. 8.
98
See id. at art. 32(3).
99
See Smolin, supra note 10 (discussing issue of orphanage donations and fees in context
of India).
96
97
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financial illicit manner, such as tricking or coercing the birth parents.
The child is living in an orphanage controlled by Mr. K. Assume that
legitimate adoption agencies in the United States regularly obtain
children from Mr. K’s orphanage, paying him a four thousand dollar per
child “foreign fee.” This money comes from the adoptive families, who
pay the money to the U.S. agency. The U.S. agency pays Mr. K. half of
the money upon some initial stage of the adoption, and the other half
when the child arrives in the United States. Although the complete and
specific purposes of the fees are not delineated, the fees do cover the care
of the child while in the orphanage, necessary medical and social
examinations and reports, attorney and court fees, general assistance to
the orphanage, and the shepherding of the adoption through an intricate,
and somewhat corrupt, adoption process.
While unstated, it is
understood that some portion of the fees may be used, as needed, for the
payment of bribes, which are often necessary even to complete a
legitimate adoption of a true orphan. Moreover, assume that the U.S.
agency has no knowledge of the illicit relinquishment and that the fees
are handled in exactly the same way when children were properly
relinquished by their parents. Finally, Mr. K. in practice generally
pockets, personally, approximately sixty percent or twenty-four hundred
dollars of the four thousand dollar fee, even though he actually spends
no more than ten hours time working on the adoption, and his normal
salary for a year’s work outside the adoption field would be eight
thousand dollars.
In this hypothetical,100 it is arguable whether the element of quid pro
quo, involving the exchange of financial gain for transfer of the child, is
present. On the one hand, this situation could be seen as a matter of
payment for services—or more precisely, gross overpayment for
services. While overpayment for services can be seen as violating norms
against profiteering or improper financial gain, such a violation does not
necessarily turn an adoption into a sale of a child. Indeed, Mr. K. can
plausibly argue that since he was paid for services rendered he is not
liable for selling children.
On the other hand, it would be possible to argue that the
combination of illicit taking of the child from his parents and
100
I would stress that Mr. K. does not refer to any particular person, but rather is meant
to describe an unfortunately typical example of a somewhat corrupt adoption orphanage
director in a sending country. The choice of the letter “K” is meant as an allusion to
Kafka’s work. Of course I do not think that such persons are innocent victims of an
absurdist bureaucracy; here, the sources of absurdity have to be found elsewhere.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 [2004], Art. 1

320

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

profiteering or improper financial gain make this into an implicit sale of
a child. Such an argument depends on a kind of non-technical, yet
realistic conclusion that Mr. K. is in the business of obtaining children
and then selling them for a handsome profit. But how can Mr. K be a
seller of children, without labeling the U.S. adoption agency and
adoptive parents as buyers, even if unwitting buyers?
The difficulty of drawing the line between a service contract and the
sale of a child should not obscure the clear cases. It is reported that in
India, orphanages were paying “scouts” or intermediaries for children.
The intermediaries that bought a newborn for twenty dollars from an
impoverished birth family and then transferred the child to the
orphanage for two hundred dollars certainly seem to have been involved
in child selling, child trafficking, and the downstream “sale of a child.”
Ironically, however, even such scouts could claim that they were being
paid for the “service” of finding needy children in danger of infanticide
and in need of adoption and hence were not really “selling” or
transferring the child.101 Hopefully no one would “buy” this argument,
but in a strictly logical sense, the line between being paid for the
“service” of finding children, and being paid for the child, is more or less
arbitrary.
Another clear instance of intermediaries selling children in
intercountry adoption occurs when orphanages, which have either
legitimately or illegitimately obtained custody of children, choose the
adoptive parent and U.S. placement agency based on a “highest bidder”
methodology. For example, an orphanage director may let it be known
that he will place infants through the U.S. agency that provides the
highest adoption fee. Such a situation is compounded by the custom of
some U.S. intercountry adoption agencies of compensating “country
coordinators” by paying a sum per completed adoption.
This
arrangement, of course, looks suspiciously like a sales commission. If
the U.S. intermediary is paid, for example, three thousand dollars per
completed adoption—perhaps half of the agency fee—it may be
tempting for that individual to “kick back” a certain percentage of his fee
to the foreign country director in exchange for quick access to the most
adoptable children. As the foreign orphanage and various U.S.
orphanages negotiate these kinds of arrangements, they are in fact
exchanging money in consideration of the transfer of the child, a classic
form of downstream child-selling. Yet, it is possible to theoretically and

101
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practically disguise these kinds of transactions as merely standard “fees”
for services exchanged, with even “highest bidder” tactics justified as
attempts to fund the orphanage or demand higher quality service.
III. CONCLUSION: INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION AS CHILD TRAFFICKING
As the above analysis demonstrates, the fundamental legal
distinction between a legitimate adoption and the illicit sale of a child is
unclear in both theory and practice. The distinction is maintained by a
logically arbitrary system of labeling under which exchanges involving
money are classified as legitimate or illegitimate. This labeling system
unfortunately appears quite illusory because the distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate is maintained by applying conclusory legal
labels without a clear relationship to the actual nature of the underlying
transaction. Thus, the domestic system of adoption generally labels
financial benefits provided to the birth parent, and the birth parent’s
consent to adoption, as unrelated “gift” and “consent.” This labeling is
applied even where it is clear that the financial assistance is induced by
the representation that the birth parent currently intends to place the
child with those providing the “gift.” The law deliberately obscures the
true nature of the transaction through labels like “gift” to theoretically
maintain the rule against selling children. Similarly, the system
maintains the illusion that intermediaries are being paid for “services,”
rather than for the child, even when the payments are contingent on
successful delivery of the child or differ according to the characteristics
of the child, rather than according to the services rendered.
This terminological sleight of hand can be played to the point where
child selling can be explicitly defended. The best illustration of this is the
famous (or infamous) defense of child selling by Judge Richard Posner,
who argued that the law should permit birth parents to sell their infants
to adoptive families. Judge Posner defended his proposal by claiming
that it did not really amount to “baby selling” since it was merely
custodial rights, rather than children, that would be sold. From Judge
Posner’s perspective, so long as children are not reduced to the status of
slaves, they are not being sold. Hence, Judge Posner responded to the
criticism that his proposal commodified human beings, or undermined
the ban against slavery, by stating that his critics were really confused by
the “mis-use” of the term “baby selling.” Once one used the proper term
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of “sale of parental rights,” all such moral objections should disappear,
according to Judge Posner.102
One could summarize the word games and arbitrary distinctions of
both Judge Posner, and our legal system, as follows:
Judge Posner
Current law

Prohibited
Sale of children (as slaves)
Sale of children, parental,
or custodial rights

Permitted
Sale
of
parental
or
custodial rights
“Gifts” to birth parents
Birth parent “expenses”
Payment for “services”

My argument is that the law’s distinction between illicit sale of
children (or parental rights) and licit “gifts,” “expenses,” and “services”
is just as illusory as Judge Posner’s distinction between illicit sale of
children and licit sale of parental rights. Just as Judge Posner’s proposal
to permit the sale of parental rights would render a prohibition of babyselling illusory, the law’s current permission of “gifts,” “expenses,” and
“services” makes the law’s prohibition of selling parental rights and
children largely illusory.
I am not arguing that gifts to birth parents, birth parent expenses, or
adoption service fees, are in themselves necessarily unethical or
tantamount to baby selling. However, the context in which the law
permits these activities renders them questionable and allows children to
be commercialized and commodified.
Thus, in the context of
intercountry adoption, it is illusory to distinguish between buying
children, and paying for adoption services, when the law has no effective
system of preventing adoption intermediaries from profiteering from
adoption.
Where the law permits orphanages to become profit centers
generating wealth far beyond normal compensation for services, the
concept of “payment for services” is a legal fiction ineffectively hiding a
commercial trade in children. Where the law permits adoptive parents
to be charged for “orphanage donations,” but has no effective means of
ensuring that these funds are spent on children, rather than being
pocketed by intermediaries, “donations” become a legal fiction
facilitating a trade in children. Similarly, the distinction between gifts to
birth parents and illicitly inducing consent through financial
102
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consideration has little meaning in an intercountry adoption system in
which aid to assist birth families to stay together is not required and in
which it is permissible to offer aid only to birth parents who consent to
adoption.
Thus, where parents give up their children for the lack of a few
hundred dollars, or less, but the intercountry adoption system spends
tens of thousands of dollars completing the adoption of the child, the
concept of compassionate adoption becomes a cruel hoax. Moreover,
where impoverished parents in developing nations are offered financial
assistance only when they relinquish their children, and the law
considers this a licit “gift” unless agency and parent virtually confess to
intending a sale, as a result a ban on child selling becomes illusory.
Similarly, within the domestic system the concept of paying for services,
but not for children, becomes illusory when agencies charge far more for
high-demand white infants, evidencing the development of a market in
children. The willingness of the law to label such an obvious sign of a
market as a mere “payment of permissible services” indicates that the
adoption system is mired in legal fictions with little relationship to the
underlying commodification of children.
Thus, adoption can only maintain a principled and enforceable line
against child selling and child trafficking when effective systems of
enforceable regulation are in place that effectively prevent adoption
systems from becoming markets in children. The refusal or failure of the
domestic and intercountry adoption systems to put those needed
regulations into place speaks volumes regarding the ethics of the
domestic and intercountry adoption systems.103 Unfortunately, upon
closer examination it appears that the ethics of the adoption systems,
both domestic and intercountry, are just as illusory and fictional as the
legal prohibitions on child-selling.
If my argument is correct, then those who label intercountry
adoption as a form of child trafficking are largely correct, at least under
current circumstances and contexts. Intercountry adoption is a form of
child trafficking not because adoptive families in rich countries obtain
poor children from developing and transition economy nations. Rather,

103
My comments on the system of domestic adoption pertain only to the placement of
healthy infants. The domestic system for placing abused and neglected children from the
foster care system, or special needs children generally, is quite different and is not
addressed in this article.
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intercountry adoption is a form of child trafficking because the law and
current systems of intercountry adoption permit it to operate as such.
I am not arguing that every individual adoption in the current
intercountry adoption system constitutes the illicit sale of a child or illicit
child trafficking. I am confident that there are many intercountry
adoptions that are ethical, where money has not played any improper or
illicit role. Moreover, some of the most important sending nations are
free of significant child trafficking within their adoption systems.
However, the system as a whole is corrupt because it has no effective
means of preventing intercountry adoption from degenerating into illicit
child trafficking. This legal failure, moreover, is not merely a theoretical
difficulty. According to one estimate, over forty percent of significant
sending nations over the last fifteen years have been shut down due
primarily to adoption scandals concerning corruption and child
trafficking.104 This estimate, moreover, does not include nations, such as
India, that have been plagued by significant adoption scandals but have
not experienced a nation-wide shutdown or moratorium. The gaps in
the law, therefore, are accompanied by recurrent and systematic babyselling scandals. Moreover, these abusive adoption practices are not new
but have been going on for decades.105 The problems with intercountry
adoption and child trafficking are systematic and recurrent, not
exceptional or occasional.

104
See Ethica, Intercountry Adoption Reform Act (ICARE); Suggested Amendments and
Comments on Suggested Language, (July 13, 2004), available at https://www.ethicanet.org/
ICAREcomments.pdf. The report notes:
Over the last 15 years, 40 different countries were in the Top 20
Countries of Origin for U.S. Families. Of these, 13 are currently closed
or effectively closed. (By effectively closed, we mean that the number
of children being adopted has fallen to 26 or less each year including
orphan petitions filed by immediate relatives or those living in the
foreign country. Former numbers ranged from 79 to 1,122 per country,
with an average of 306).

An additional four countries are closed, reportedly temporarily, to
investigate concerns or establish new procedures. Together, these 17
countries account for 43 percent of the 40 most common countries for
U.S. citizens to adopt from. Virtually all of these countries closed due
to concerns about corruption, child trafficking or abduction.
Id.
105
See, e.g., Pierce & Vitillo, supra note 58, at 138-42 (documenting abusive adoption
practices, some documented from a 1980 book); Carro, supra note 29 (documenting already
long-standing abusive intercountry adoption practices).
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Of course, it could be argued that the very nature of intercountry
adoption, involving a transaction between rich and poor nations, lends
itself to abuse, and therefore the choice is ultimately between shutting
down intercountry adoption, or allowing it to continue, in the interests of
saving children, despite these abuses. This kind of argument implicitly
justifies child trafficking in the name of the best interest of the child.
Such justifications are not of the explicit sort provided by Judge Posner
but rather of the apologetic, “we just can’t stop it,” variety. From this
perspective, child selling in the guise of adoption becomes a kind of vice
crime, like gambling or prostitution, that the law is helpless to stop and
that may cause more harm than good to prevent. It is against this kind
of argument that the introduction of this Article, as well as my prior
article on the Indian adoption scandals, are directed. Child trafficking is
not a mere “vice” crime that the law may legalize, regulate, or allow to
operate in the shadows. Child trafficking is a profound violation of
human rights that law and society must energetically seek to abolish,
wherever it may be found and whatever disguises it may adopt.
Further, as this Article makes clear, the law has in no way exhausted the
regulatory possibilities for preventing intercountry adoption from
degenerating into a form of trafficking. Only when the law has
energetically implemented the obvious and rational regulatory steps to
prevent adoption as trafficking can the argument be made that the only
choices are banning intercountry adoption or permitting trafficking.
Indeed, it is those supposed advocates of intercountry adoptions who
resist such regulations and excuse the presence of trafficking in the
adoption system, who are digging the grave of intercountry adoption.
Intercountry adoption is a conditional good; intercountry adoption
as child trafficking is an evil. Only when the law, society, and
intercountry adoption system are reformed will the conditions under
which intercountry adoption can flourish as a good be established.
Unfortunately, the prospects for such reform are poor because there are
few within the current intercountry adoption system with the motivation
to demand it. Hence, the recurrent cycle of scandal, excuse, and
ineffective “reform” will probably continue until intercountry adoption
is finally abolished, with history labeling the entire enterprise as a neocolonialist mistake. It does not have to be this way, but it will take more
than legal fictions and illusory restrictions on child trafficking to prevent
the ultimate demise of the intercountry adoption system.
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